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Abstract
Socio-economic performance differs not only across countries but within countries too and can persist
even after religion, language, and formal institutions are long shared. One interpretation of these
disparities is that successful regions are characterized by higher levels of trust, and, more generally,
of cooperation. Here we study a classic case of within-country disparities, the Italian North-South
divide, to find out whether people exhibit geographically distinct abilities to cooperate independently
of many other factors and whence these differences emerge. Through an experiment in four Italian
cities, we study the behavior of a sample of the general population toward trust and contributions to
the common good. We find that trust and contributions vary in unison, and diminish moving from
North to South. This regional gap cannot be attributed to payoffs from cooperation or to institutions,
formal or informal, that may vary across Italy, as the experimental methodology silences their impact.
The gap is also independent of risk and other-regarding preferences which we measure experimentally,
suggesting that the lower ability to cooperate we find in the South is not due to individual “moral”
flaws. The gap could originate from emergent collective properties, such as different social norms and
the expectations they engender. The absence of convergence in behavior during the last 150 years,
since Italy was unified, further suggests that these norms can persist overtime. Using a millennium-
long dataset, we explore whether the quality of past political institutions and the frequency of wars
could explain the emergence of these differences in norms.
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1 Introduction
A political border can make all the difference for the socio-economic outcomes of two other-
wise identical regions. Nogales, for instance, a city cut in half by the US-Mexican border, is
a vivid illustration of the powerful driving force of formal institutions (Acemoglu and Robin-
son, 2012). In other cases, neighboring regions under the same formal institutions show such
sharp discontinuities as if they were divided by an invisible frontier. Two villages in the Alps,
Tret and St. Felix, for example, have sat side by side for centuries in the same jurisdiction
and under identical environmental conditions, and yet exhibit dramatic and persistent dif-
ferences in socio-economic patterns (Cole and Wolf, 1974). The reason seems to lie in the
entrenched but distinct preferences and social norms.
Here we study a classic grand case of the latter type, Italy, whose regions present dramatic
differences in terms of economic success. Since its Unification in 1861, the country’s formal
institutions are shared, yet the disparities between the Northern and the Southern regions
have persisted along many social and economic dimensions (Putnam et al., 1993; Guiso et al.,
2004; Daniele and Malanima, 2011). These disparities have received much scholarly attention
over the last fifty years. To our knowledge, however, this is the first time that a controlled
field experiment was employed to uncover their behavioral foundations in terms of the ability
to cooperate.
Cooperation – which we define as a joint effort which benefits the group at some cost
to the individual – has been identified as a major determinant of economic success (Nowak
and Highfield, 2011), but its variability across regions can be difficult to measure; the reason
is that observed differences often derive not only from disparities in terms of formal and
informal institutions but also from differences in the payoffs from cooperation. By contrast,
the employed experimental methodology removes the confounding factors that could shape
behavior such as the degree of corruption, the varying efficiency of the public administration
or the level of mafia intrusion. Should regional disparities emerge as distinct behavioral
responses to otherwise identical experimental conditions, the implication would be that they
are not so much due to differences in institutions or incentives but rather to differences in
preferences or in social norms.
Italy offers the necessary variability in socio-economic performances and local histories
to investigate cooperative behavior, while, at the same time, exhibiting constancy in several
relevant factors such as institutions, language and dominant religion. These characteristics
allow us to go beyond previous experiments based on cross-country evidence, which have
shown that cooperation co-varies with factors shared at society level, such as market inte-
gration, production technology, religion, the quality of the rule of law, and the degree of
globalization (Henrich et al., 2010; Herrmann et al., 2008; Buchan et al., 2009).
In a controlled experiment, we study whether differences in cooperation rely on differences
in individual traits or are, by contrast, the result of emergent properties of societies. Edward
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Banfield famously claimed that the origin of the North-South gap in Italy lies in “moral” flaws
of Southerners, whose only concern would be with the welfare of self and of immediate family
members with utter disregard for anyone else (Banfield and Fasano, 1958). Alternatively, the
behavioral gap could be due to collective dimensions, such as social norms, group cohesion,
or mutual expectations. We performed an in-depth analysis of each society, by collecting
multiple measures of in-group cooperation and of individual traits, in an experiment with a
large pool of participants (about 150 per city). The measures of cooperation were obtained
through a three-player trust game and a public good game; the measures of individual traits
were obtained through a set of dictator games and a lottery. All these dimensions of behavior,
which are rarely studied jointly in cross-cultural studies, can in theory be expected to affect
cooperation. In addition, we combine the experimental findings with a historical record
about the quality of institutions and the frequency of external violent conflicts during the
last millennium. On this basis we construct a ranking of plausibility among the various
conjectures present in the literature on how collective experiences in the distant past shape
current behavior (Tabellini, 2008; Benhabib et al., 2011; Nunn and Wantchekon, 2011).
The experiment was conducted in four Italian cities, with a representative sample of
the general population (N=618). We chose two cities in the North and two in the South,
and in order to uncover deep-rooted dispositions, we focused on medium-size cities large
enough to study cooperation with individuals beyond the immediate family circle, but small
enough to have a stable community, in which dispositions are well known and shared. For
each city the recruited sample was balanced in terms of age, sex, and occupation, which
is uncommon in previous experimental cross-country studies. The representativeness of the
sample is particularly relevant for a research on the sources of cooperation: first, because it
increases the comparability across societies; second, because it boosts the external validity of
the results when compared with studies run with college students. In order to capture local
emergent properties, it is essential for all participants to belong to the same community and
to experience repeated interactions. For this purpose, we chose participants who were born
and resided in the county where we ran the experiments, an information which we divulged
to participants.
We report four main findings. First, trust and contributions to the public good vary in
unison. Second, we find that both trust and contributions are higher in the North than in
the South. Third, differences in risk and other-regarding preferences cannot account for the
observed gap in cooperation, hence suggesting that the divide is an emergent property of
societies and is not due to individual “moral” flaws. Finally, we find that the quality of past
political institutions and the frequency of external violent conflicts in the last millennium
could explain the emergence of these differences in norms.
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the the experimental
design and the procedures used to select the sample and the experimental locations. Section
3
3 presents the main experimental findings and Section 4 discusses the historical data and
their link to present measures of cooperation. Section 5 concludes.
2 Sample and design
2.1 Experimental locations and sample selection
We selected the experimental locations following rigorous criteria and with three goals in
mind: (i) to cover Italian counties (‘Province’ in Italian)1 both in the North and in the South
macro-areas; (ii) to maximize the difference relative to social capital within each macro-area;
and (iii) to have medium-size cities. First, in order to cover both macro-areas, we included
two counties in the North and two in the South of Italy.2 We excluded the Sardegna Island
because of its geographical and historical peculiarities.
The second selection criterion pertained the level of social capital in each county. The
aim was to increase the likelihood of sampling counties that would differ in terms of trusting
and cooperative behavior. Hence, the choice of the counties was made so to maximize the
difference in their social capital level. The proxies for social capital were those widely adopted
in the literature (i.e., Putnam et al., 1993; Guiso et al., 2004, 2006): association density,3
electoral participation,4 and blood donations.5
To aggregate these multiple measures of social capital into a single index, we adopted the
following procedure. First, we separately ranked all Italian counties according to each of the
three dimensions. In each ranking, position 1 was assigned to the county with the highest
value in the current dimension and the last position to the county with the lowest value. The
1As of December 2000, there were 103 counties in Italy; other 7 counties were introduced by the Italian Government
between 2001 and 2011, which we did not include due to lack of data for one or more of the adopted selection criteria.
2North and South are defined according to the official classification of the National Bureau of Statistics, Istat, see
http://www.istat.it/it/archivio/6789. The regions of the North are Piemonte, Valle d’Aosta, Lombardia, Trentino-Alto
Adige, Veneto, Friuli-Venezia Giulia, Liguria, Emilia-Romagna. The regions of the center are: Toscana, Umbria, Marche,
Lazio. The regions of the South are Abruzzo, Molise, Campania, Puglia, Calabria, Sicilia, and Sardegna.
3 Association density at the county level in year 2000 is computed as the number of associations (cultural, leisure, artistic,
sports, environmental, and any kind of nonprofit associations) per 100,000 inhabitants (Source: ISTAT). We considered
registered voluntary associations according to law 291/91 per 100,000 inhabitants, collected in ‘Primo censimento istituzioni
nonprofit in Italia, 1999.’ We excluded professional and religious associations in accordance to the convention adopted in
the literature on social capital (Putnam et al., 1993; La Porta et al., 1997).
4 Electoral participation considers the average per county turnout, expressed as the percentage of eligible voters in all
referenda held in Italy from 1946 to 1999 (Guiso et al., 2004 on original data of the Italian Ministry of Internal Affairs).
The counties of Belluno and Aosta have missing values for referenda turnout. We assigned to Belluno the average value
for the Veneto region and to Aosta the average value of the Piemonte region. Referenda are chosen in place of political
elections as they are considered a better proxy of the desire of civic participation, rather than the regular Parliamentary
elections. The reasons are varied: voting at referenda is not mandatory in Italy, the issues on the ballot in referenda are less
related to local interests, and referenda are immune from possible contamination from the so called ‘exchange vote.’ The
exchange vote is an illegal practice according to which people may receive a payment in order to cast a vote for a particular
candidate (See also Guiso et al., 2010; Putnam et al., 1993).
5 We considered the number of blood donations per 1,000 inhabitants in each county in year 2002 (Cartocci, 2007). Data
for Lazio and Puglia are available at the regional rather than county level and data for the counties of Gorizia and Trieste
are the average value for the two counties.
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county with the highest level of social capital was picked according to a minimax criterion:
the score for each county was computed by taking the maximum among the three rankings
and than selecting the county with the lowest score. The county with the lowest level of social
capital was picked according to a maximin criterion: the score for each county was computed
by taking the minimum value among the values of three rankings and then selecting the
county with the highest score. The procedure was performed including all Italian counties,
divided into two groups: North and South. The Central counties are placed in one of the
two clusters.6 The county with the highest (lowest) social capital in the North was Ravenna
(Cuneo), while the county with the highest (lowest) social capital in the South was Ragusa
(Crotone). The procedure is robust to excluding the counties of Central Italy.
Finally, we considered the size of the city where the experiment would take place. Al-
though participants were recruited from the whole county, we aimed at cities that could be
compared in terms of size (between 50,000-100,000 inhabitants). Consider that the aver-
age size of an Italian county capital is 160,428 inhabitants, a value that lowers to 94,824
when excluding the five largest Italian cities (Roma, Milano, Torino, Palermo, Napoli). The
corresponding median populations are 82,367 and 72,329, respectively. The average munic-
ipality in Italy is much smaller: 7,492 inhabitants.7 We wanted to avoid both extremely
small towns and large metropolitan cities to have a measure of deep-seated social norms
specific to the area. As we aimed at studying interactions among strangers, very small cities
could make difficult to achieve the required anonymity among participants. On the other
hand, in large cities the population is more diverse and it has higher mobility. After having
identified the counties of interest, we restricted the attention to medium-size cities. All the
cities are provincial capitals except for Faenza. In particular, Faenza (56,992 inhabitants)
was selected instead of Ravenna as the latter has more than 100,000 inhabitants (155,997 at
2009).8 Thus, the four cities selected are: Cuneo, Faenza, Crotone, and Ragusa (see Table
A-1 in Appendix).
The four Italian cities chosen as experimental locations are geographically distant both
in terms of kilometers and traveling times. Consider traveling by car from the northernmost
town of Cuneo to the southernmost town of Ragusa. According to Google maps, it takes
4 hours and 25 minutes to drive from Cuneo to Faenza (458 km), and then an additional
9 hours and 46 minutes to reach Crotone (919 km). From Crotone it takes 6 hours and 13
minutes to arrive in Ragusa (425 km).
Study participants were recruited among the general population of each county. To be
eligible for the study, subjects had to: (i) be at least 18 years old; (ii) be born in the county;
(iii) be resident in the county; (iv) have a good knowledge of spoken and written Italian.
The purpose of these requirements was to ensure that subjects shared the social norms of the
6Marche, Umbria and Toscana to the Northern group and Lazio to the Southern group. Latitude was used to decide the
assignment.
7Source: Istat, http://demo.istat.it/pop2010/index.html.
8Source. Istat: http://demo.istat.it/pop2010/index.html
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place or had at least a profound knowledge of them. These restrictions were explained during
the recruitment process and the experimenters double checked this condition by looking at
the ID of each participant before the experimental sessions. At the beginning of each session,
the experimenter made it public that all subjects in the room were born and resident in
the county (or at least in the region) in order to make this information common knowledge.
Among the 581 subjects for which we have questionnaire data, 97.3% were born in the county,
2.4% in the region, and 0.3% outside the region. About 92.7% of the participants turned out
to be at least second generation natives of the county, based on the reported birthplace of
their mother and father (i.e., at least one of their parents was born in the county).
We wanted a representative sample of the Italian population in respect to age, sex, and
employment status, since these demographics characteristics could be important to identify
social norms. The sample was stratified according to three categories of age (18-39, 40-59,
60 and older), two of sex (male and female), and three of employment status (employed;
housewives and retired; others, including students and unemployed). For the composition of
the target sample, we referred to the 2009 statistics on the Italian population.9 Table A-2
in Appendix summarizes the socio-demographic characteristics of the actual sample. Two
professional companies –Metis-Ricerche and Demoskopea– were hired for the recruitment of
subjects.10
2.2 Experimental design and procedures
The study included two types of sessions: roughly half of the subjects participated in the
Public Goods (PGG) session and half in the Trust Game (TG) session along with three
modified Dictator Games. Everyone undertook a choice over lotteries. The experiment
comprised collective tasks (square in Figure 1) and individual tasks (triangles in Figure 1).
Each PGG session comprised five tasks presented in a fixed order. In the first task
(Lottery), we employed a procedure similar to Eckel and Grossman (2008) to elicit risk
preferences. Subjects had to choose from a list of six lotteries; each lottery had two possible
outcomes (high, low) that occurred with equal probability (Table 1). Only two randomly
selected subjects per session received a payment for the lottery task. To avoid any possible
carry over effect, lotteries earnings and winners were determined only at the end of the session,
by a manual draw of a colored ball out of a bag. In the second task (PGG-Standard), subjects
faced 8 rounds of a standard Public Goods game. In each round, subjects were randomly
assigned to groups of N = 4 according to a strangers matching protocol and they could
contribute either 0, 6, 14 or 20 money units (MUs) to a group project. Every MU invested
in the project was doubled and shared equally among group members, hence generating 0.5
9Inhabitants at 1st of January 2009. Age range: 18-39 years, 34.8%; 40-59 years, 34.6%; 60 and more, 31.6%.
Sex: male, 48%; female 52%. Employment status: employed, 42%; housewives and retired, 37%; others 21%. Source:
http://demo.istat.it/pop2009/index1.html
10 See the Appendix for further details on the recruitment process.
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Figure 1: Experimental Tasks
MUs for everyone in the group. Tasks three, four, and five included two variations of the
PGG and are not included in the present paper. Task three (PGG-Punishment) consisted
of 8 rounds of a PGG with punishment.11 Task four was identical to task two but lasted
4 rounds. Finally, in task five subjects faced 8 rounds of a public good with a threshold
(PGG-Threshold).12
Table 1: Lottery Task
High payoff Low payoff Risk-aversion
(orange ball) (white ball) (CRRA)
Lottery 1 17.5 17.5 >3.64
Lottery 2 22.5 15.0 3.46-1.16
Lottery 3 27.5 12.5 1.16-0.70
Lottery 4 32.5 10.0 0.70-0.50
Lottery 5 37.5 7.5 0.50-0
Lottery 6 44.0 1.0 <0
Notes: As an index of risk-aversion we take the ranges of
the coefficient of constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) im-
plied by subjects’ choices. These indexes were not shown to
subjects. Payoffs are in Euros.
Each TG session included four tasks that were presented in a fixed order. The first task
was a Lottery and it was identical to the first task of the PGG sessions. In the second
task, subjects faced three modified Dictator Games (DGs): DG1, DG2, and DG3. Session
participants were divided into groups of three members. In each game, a subject had to
choose how to allocate amounts of MUs among himself and the other two group members.
Table 2 presents the six alternative allocations available in each situation. Each subject was
asked to play as the dictator (red player) in DG1, DG2, and DG3; at the end of the session,
11In each round, after playing the standard version of the PGG, subjects could assign 0, 1 or 2 deduction points to each
group member. Each deduction point had a cost of 1 MU for the punisher and reduced the earnings of the targeted subject
by 4 MUs. Punishment decisions were simultaneous and new groups were formed at the end of each period.
12In this case the public good was provided only if all four subjects in the group contributed 20; in case the threshold
was not reached, contributions were not refunded. Data for this task are not analyzed in the current paper.
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only one of the games was selected at random for payment. Importantly, roles in the game
were then randomly assigned to determine earnings. We now describe each dictator game.
In DG1 the dictator (red) always earned 160 MUs and he faced choices between equality
vs. group wealth. While allocation 1 ensured equal earnings to all three group members (E),
allocation 6 delivered the highest sum of earnings for the group (W). Allocations 2, 3, 4,
and 5 provided intermediate situations between E and W. A merely self-interested dictator
would be indifferent among all the available allocations, while the choice of a dictator who
cares for others’ welfare would reveal his relative preferences for equality over group wealth.
In DG2 the dictator faced a tradeoff between self-interest and group wealth. As a matter of
fact, DG1 and DG2 shared two main features. First, allocation 6 (W) was identical in both
games. Second, group wealth varied with the allocation k=1,..,6 but was identical across
DG1 and DG2 (Table 2). The main difference between DG1 and DG2 resided in the earnings
of the dictators; while dictator’s earnings are constant in the former situation, they vary from
160 to 190 MUs in the latter. Allocations 1 through 6 in DG2 were designed to have the
same level of inequality as measured according to Fehr and Schmidt (1999)’s model, under
the assumption of equal weights for disadvantageous and advantageous inequality.13 Hence, a
purely self-interested dictator would always choose allocation 1 (S) over all other allocations
in DG2. In contrast, in DG3 group wealth is kept constant (480 MUs) in all six allocations
and the dictator faces a tradeoff between self-interest and equality. Allocation 1 (S) yields
the highest earnings to the dictator but the distribution is highly unequal, whereas allocation
6 (E) presents equality of earnings and yields the lowest earnings for the dictator. A self-
interested dictator will choose allocation 1 and earn 190 MUs, while a dictator concerned
with inequality may choose allocation 6 and earn 160 MUs.
In the third task (TG-Baseline), subjects were divided into groups of three and played 10
rounds of a trust game. The truster decided first and could trust or not two trustees. If the
truster did not trust, everyone in the group earned 20 (MUs) and the trustees had no choice
to make. If the truster trusted and at least one trustee reciprocated, the truster earned 36
MUs, and each trustee earned 30 MUs. When no trustee reciprocated, the truster earned
0 MUs and each trustee earned 48 MUs. At the end of each round, roles were randomly
re-assigned and new groups were formed according to a strangers protocol (in each session
there were two matching groups). Finally, the fourth task consisted of 10 additional rounds
of a modified TG, which are not reported in the present paper.14
All sessions were held in hotel conference rooms or educational centers located near to the
city center and each location was devoid of any political or religious connotation (see Figure
A-1in the Appendix). They were easy to reach for the participants, i.e. accessible by car and
by public transport, and near or at well-known locations. We moved the BLESS laboratory
13The difference in inequality measured according to Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)’s model is also minimal in these
allocations.
14A trustee who does not reciprocate while the other does earned 20 (instead of 30). For a more detailed description
of the game and the equilibrium structure, see the Coordination version of the Collective Trust Game discussed in Bigoni
et al. (2013).
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Table 2: Modified 3-player Dictator Games
DG1: Equality vs. Group Wealth
Allocations
1 (E) 2 3 4 5 6 (W)
You (red) 160 160 160 160 160 160
Other participant (black) 160 154 148 142 136 130
Other participant (white) 160 196 232 268 304 340
Group wealth 480 510 540 570 600 630
DG2: Self-Interest vs. Group Wealth
Allocations
1 (S) 2 3 4 5 6 (W)
You (red) 190 184 178 172 166 160
Other participant (black) 40 58 76 94 112 130
Other participant (white) 250 268 286 304 322 340
Group wealth 480 510 540 570 600 630
DG3: Self-Interest vs. Equality
Allocations
1 (S) 2 3 4 5 6 (E)
You (red) 190 184 178 172 166 160
Other participant (black) 40 64 88 112 136 160
Other participant (white) 250 232 214 196 178 160
Group wealth 480 480 480 480 480 480
from Bologna to the locations of the experiment, by using a van. The laboratory hardware
and set-up were identical across all cities – 32 notebook computers connected through a
wireless network to a laptop server. Upon arrival, subjects were seated at a desk; visual
contact among participants was not possible, and no form of communication was allowed
during the experiment. All participants signed a consent form and a data release form. At
the beginning of each task, the relevant instructions were distributed and read out loud. The
experimenter who read the instructions was the same in all sessions and in all cities. Before
each task, subjects had to answer a computerized quiz to ensure correct understanding of the
game before each task, with the exception of the lottery. Our subject pool included a rather
large number of elderly and uneducated people: this called for a user friendly interface and
simplified tasks. We largely relied on graphical elements to make the task more intuitive;15
choices were made by simply touching the screen. Indeed, there was no need to type on
the keyboard or use the mouse. In an effort to reduce the complexity of the decision tasks,
we limited the number of available options in each decision. At the end of the session,
we administrated a computerized questionnaire including several measures of risk, trust,
trustworthiness, and social capital, in addition to socio-demographic information.
A total of 618 subjects participated in the study, which was conducted between March
and October 2011. The number of participants in a session ranged between 24 and 32, and
everyone participated in only one session. Sessions were run in the evening or on Satur-
day in order to favor a wider participation. The experiment was programmed with z-tree
15In programming our interfaces, we took inspiration form the first wave of experiments conducted at the Internet
Laboratory for Experimental Economics, iLEE (for further details see: http://www.econ.ku.dk/cee/ilee/description/ilee1/).
9
(Fischbacher, 2007) and conducted using the mobile Bologna Laboratory for Experiments in
Social Sciences (BLESS). The average PGG (TG) session lasted about 2 hours (1 hour and
30 minutes). Subjects received 30 Euros gasoline vouchers for showing up on time, plus a
cash payment corresponding to the sum of their earnings in each part. Payments were made
privately right after the end of the experiment; average per-capita earnings were 16.5 (17.5)
Euros in cash in PGG (TG) sessions plus 30 Euros in gasoline vouchers.16
3 Results
3.1 Voluntary contributions and trust go hand in hand
We found that the higher is trust in the TG the higher are the levels of voluntary contribution
in the PGG. Figure 2 reports the average contribution in the PGG (as a fraction of the
endowment) and the average trust frequency in the TG across all rounds. The dashed ellipses
are drawn at a 95% confidence level after a bootstrapping procedure: for every county, we
randomly draw, with repetition, 10,000 pairs of observations from our sample. TG and PGG
involved different participants – which makes the measures fully independent of each other
– and tasks with different parameters and types of strategic interaction. Yet, results are
agreeing, which indicates the presence of a robust behavioral trait. On both tasks, the most
cooperative city is Cuneo (0.502 in TG and 0.485 in PGG), and the least cooperative is
Ragusa (0.346 in TG and 0.365 in PGG).
Figure 2: Cooperation across Italy
The ranking of cities according to average trust is identical to the ranking based on con-
tributions. This novel evidence that trust and contributions vary in unison across cities
suggests that they share a common root, which we identify as the collective ability to coop-
erate. Further support to this result is provided by regression analysis (Table 3). Since trust
16Reported payments include also earnings for the fourth task of the TG and fifth task of PGG(PGG-threshold).
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and contributions are elicited on two different pools of subjects, it is not possible to compare
them directly, at the individual level. We thus used a linear regression, where the dependent
variable is the average individual contribution in the PGG, and the only independent variable
in Model 1 is the frequency of trust measured at the county level (Table 3). To account for
possible session effects, in this and in all the following regressions standard errors are robust
for clustering at the session level. Results indicate that an increase by 10 percentage points in
the frequency of trust corresponds to a highly significant increase of the average contribution,
by about 1.5 points.
In a second specification (Table 3, Model 2), we include additional regressors to control
for individual characteristics, elicited in the final questionnaire. More specifically, Model 2
includes a dummy taking value 1 for males (Male), two dummies to control for age (Age
40-59 and Age 60 and above), two dummies to control for the occupational status of the
subject (Housewife/retired and Student/Unemployed), and one dummy taking value one for
those subjects that had troubles answering the control questions (Low understanding).17
Results from Model 2 indicate that the positive and significant relation between trust and
individual contributions in the PGG is not driven uniquely by differences in the individual
characteristics of our subjects across cities.18
3.2 Cooperation levels display a North-South ordering
In line with the theories that link cooperation and economic development (Zak and Knack,
2001; Knack and Keefer, 1997), we find that cooperation is higher in the North and lower
in the South. Contributions in the PGG across cities are ordered along a North-South
continuum (Jonckheere-Terpstra test: p-value= 0.037, z=2.09, n=13, two-sided).19 Similarly,
the frequency of trusting behavior also displays a North-South ordering (Jonckheere-Terpstra
test: p-value=0.009, z=- 2.61, n=18, 2 independent observations per session, two-sided).
Figure 2 and non-parametric tests suggest that not only trust and contributions in the
PGG are strongly correlated, but they are also aligned with cities’ latitude. Further support
to this result is provided by a series of linear regressions, where the dependent variable is
either the average contribution to the PGG (Table 4) or the frequency of trustful choices in
the TG (Table 5) – both taken at the individual level – and we include each city’s latitude
as a regressor (Model 1). In Model 2 we add controls for the same individual characteristics
17To account both for subjects that were particularly slow in answering the control questions, and for those who made
several mistakes, we attribute value 1 to the dummy variable Low understanding for all subjects who were in the last decile
either according to their total answering time, or according to their total number of mistakes. This measure is built at the
city level and separating the two treatments. Due to technical problems, we lack personal information for 37 persons in the
sample (24 from the first PGG session in Faenza and 13 from two PGG sessions, May 25 and 28 in Ragusa). In Model 2
we include a dummy taking value one for these 37 subjects, and zero otherwise (Missing questionnaire).
18 As a robustness check, we also run the symmetric regression, where the dependent variable was the frequency of trust
(see, Table A-3 in Appendix).
19 We use a Jonckheere-Terpstra test, a non-parametric test for more than two independent samples, designed to test for
ordered differences between treatments (Hollander and Wolfe, 1999). For this test, we take as single observation the average
contribution at the session level, and the frequency of trustful choices at the matching group level (two in each session).
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Table 3: Average individual contributions to the PGG vs. trust at the county level.
Dep.var.: Average Individual Contribution to the PGG
Model 1 Model 2
Trust frequency in the county 15.320*** 13.310***
(3.421) (2.817)
Male 0.309
(0.425)
Age 40-59 1.840**
(0.791)
Age 60 and above 0.790
(0.964)
Housewife/Retired 1.611**
(0.559)
Student/Unemployed 0.492
(0.861)
Low understanding 0.906
(0.705)
Missing questionnaire 4.299***
(0.738)
N.obs. 372 372
R-squared 0.027 0.087
Notes: OLS regression with standard errors robust for
clustering at the session level (in parentheses). Symbols
∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and
10% level, respectively.
considered in Table 3. In Model 3 of Table 5, we also add controls for subjects’ preferences
toward risk of nature: the dummy Strongly risk averse (Risk neutral/Risk loving) takes value
1 for subjects choosing Lottery 1 or 2 (5 or 6) and 0 otherwise in the Lottery task. In Model
4 of Table 5 we also control for other-regarding preferences – i.e., strong concerns for group
wealth and equality. The dummy Strong concerns for group wealth is equal to 1 if a subject
chooses options 4, 5, or 6 in DG1 and DG2 (Table 2) and zero otherwise. Symmetrically, the
dummy Strong concerns for equality takes value 1 when a subjects chooses 1, 2 or 3 in DG1
and 4, 5 or 6 in DG3 (Table 2) and 0 otherwise. Results from Tables 4 and 5 indicate that
contributions and trust are significantly and positively correlated with latitude.
To further verify that the observed differences in cooperation levels across cities – measured
either as contributions to the PGG or as trust in the TG – are not uniquely determined by
differences in individual characteristics, in Model 4 of Table 4 and in Models 5 and 6 of Table
5, we remove the coefficient Latitude and leave all the aforementioned controls for individual
characteristics. Results indicate that age and occupational status may be correlated with
trust and contributions, but this effect is orthogonal to the effect of latitude.
Trust levels could however be a response to trustworthiness levels: trustworthiness can
influence trust because trust pays off when a high fraction of the population is trustwor-
thy. Being trustworthy also follows a North-South ordering: the individual frequencies of
trustworthy choices in the TG are 34% in Cuneo, 33% in Faenza, 32% in Crotone, and 25%
in Ragusa (Jonckheere-Terpstra test: p-value=0.049, z=-1.97, n=18, two-sided). However,
trustworthiness does not significantly correlate with latitude according to an OLS regression
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Table 4: Average individual contribution to the PGG vs. latitude.
Dep.var.: Average Individual Contribution to the PGG
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Latitude 0.223** 0.182** 0.169**
(0.077) (0.061) (0.064)
Male 0.308 0.247 0.234
(0.431) (0.446) (0.440)
Age 40-59 1.889** 2.004** 2.113**
(0.802) (0.754) (0.757)
Age 60 and above 0.836 0.938 1.154
(0.941) (0.908) (0.881)
Housewife/Retired 1.614** 1.813*** 1.672**
(0.551) (0.549) (0.598)
Student/Unemployed 0.468 0.665 0.666
(0.863) (0.876) (0.880)
Low understanding 0.911 0.969 0.928
(0.720) (0.717) (0.726)
Missing questionnaire 4.108*** 3.945*** 4.534***
(0.843) (0.859) (0.760)
Strongly risk averse 0.870 0.903
(0.564) (0.572)
Risk neutral/Risk loving -0.875* -0.936*
(0.426) (0.432)
N.obs. 372 372 372 372
R-squared 0.022 0.080 0.097 0.085
Notes: OLS regression with standard errors robust for clustering at the session
level (in parentheses). Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5%
and 10% level, respectively.
(see Table 6). In Model 1, we include each city’s latitude as a regressor, and in Model 2 we
add controls for the same individual characteristics considered in Table 3. In Model 3, we
also add controls for subjects’ preferences on the risk of nature, and in Model 4 we introduce
controls for other-regarding preferences. The average frequency of reciprocal actions is indeed
aligned with latitude, but the correlation does not seem to be significant. Differences in trust
can indeed be wider than differences in trustworthiness in a population where selfish individ-
uals coexist with altruists and conditional cooperators. Consider that selfish individuals are
never trustworthy but could trust. Indeed, trust is profitable in a society with a sufficiently
large fraction of altruists and conditional cooperators.
3.3 Can risk preferences explain the cooperation gap?
Trusting in the TG and contributing in the PGG expose participants to the risk of being
cheated; hence the cooperation gap can depend on differences in the risk preferences. Un-
like cooperation, risk preferences does not exhibit a North-South ordering (see Table 7).
Moreover, contributions in PGG and trust in TG strongly correlate with latitude also after
controlling for individual risk preferences (see Model 3 in Tables 4 and 5). An Oaxaca de-
composition confirms that individual risk preferences does not significantly account for the
observed North-South differences in contribution to the PGG and trust in the TG (Tables A-
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Table 5: Average individual trust vs. latitude.
Dep.var.: Trust frequency (at the individual level)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Latitude 0.018*** 0.017*** 0.018** 0.017**
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005) (0.005)
Male -0.006 -0.005 -0.009 0.003 -0.002
(0.034) (0.032) (0.030) (0.033) (0.031)
Age 40-59 -0.075 -0.080 -0.071 -0.081 -0.072
(0.077) (0.074) (0.072) (0.069) (0.067)
Age 60 and above 0.033 0.023 0.032 0.040 0.049
(0.084) (0.082) (0.081) (0.076) (0.076)
Housewife/Retired -0.101*** -0.099*** -0.102*** -0.108*** -0.111***
(0.027) (0.028) (0.030) (0.028) (0.030)
Student/Unemployed -0.038 -0.038 -0.033 -0.059 -0.053
(0.061) (0.059) (0.062) (0.059) (0.063)
Low understanding -0.028 -0.026 -0.030 -0.036 -0.039
(0.047) (0.047) (0.046) (0.043) (0.044)
Missing questionnaire -0.046 -0.055 -0.059 -0.139 -0.141
(0.103) (0.104) (0.106) (0.104) (0.103)
Strongly risk averse -0.044 -0.040 -0.035 -0.030
(0.061) (0.057) (0.060) (0.056)
Risk neutral/Risk loving -0.005 -0.015 -0.020 -0.030
(0.058) (0.063) (0.059) (0.065)
Strong concerns for equity -0.041 -0.046
(0.068) (0.072)
Strong concerns for effi-
ciency
0.017 0.019
(0.063) (0.066)
N.obs. 242 242 242 242 242 242
R-squared 0.027 0.047 0.050 0.055 0.027 0.033
Notes: OLS regression with standard errors robust for clustering at the matching-group level (in parenthe-
ses). Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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Table 6: Average individual trustworthiness vs. latitude.
Dep.var.: Trustworthiness frequency (at the individual level)
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6
Latitude 0.009 0.006 0.007 0.007
(0.008) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Male 0.048 0.049 0.049 0.053 0.053
(0.070) (0.070) (0.067) (0.068) (0.066)
Age 40-59 0.078 0.079 0.079 0.079 0.079
(0.063) (0.062) (0.065) (0.060) (0.064)
Age 60 and above 0.022 0.027 0.027 0.031 0.030
(0.075) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079) (0.079)
Housewife/Retired 0.042 0.040 0.040 0.038 0.038
(0.053) (0.056) (0.057) (0.054) (0.055)
Student/Unemployed -0.012 -0.008 -0.008 -0.016 -0.016
(0.067) (0.070) (0.071) (0.066) (0.068)
Low understanding 0.033 0.030 0.030 0.027 0.027
(0.066) (0.072) (0.071) (0.071) (0.071)
Missing questionnaire 0.005 0.018 0.018 -0.014 -0.014
(0.055) (0.070) (0.068) (0.077) (0.075)
Strongly risk averse 0.028 0.028 0.031 0.031
(0.076) (0.078) (0.076) (0.078)
Risk neutral/Risk loving 0.037 0.038 0.032 0.032
(0.076) (0.080) (0.075) (0.079)
Strong concerns for equity 0.001 0.001
(0.052) (0.053)
Strong concerns for effi-
ciency
-0.002 -0.000
(0.053) (0.055)
N.obs. 238 238 238 238 238 238
R-squared 0.006 0.025 0.027 0.027 0.024 0.024
Notes: OLS regression with standard errors robust for clustering at the matching-group level
(in parentheses). Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
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5 and A-6 in Appendix).20 We conclude that the cooperation gap is not driven by differences
across cities in aversion to risk.
Table 7: Risk and other-regarding preferences
Ragusa Crotone Faenza Cuneo
Tolerance for risk
Strongly risk averse 28% 21% 42% 25%
Weakly risk averse 44% 45% 42% 47%
Not risk averse 28% 34% 16% 28%
South ← → North
Altruism
Strong preference for group wealth 37% 37% 43% 35%
Strong preference for equality 33% 37% 39% 27%
Weak other-regardness or self-interest 30% 26% 18% 38%
Notes: We classify 618 participants according to their risk preferences depending on
the lottery chosen out of a menu of six (1, 2=not risk averse, 3, 4=weak, 5, 6=strong,
Table 1). We also classify 246 participants according to their choices in the three DGs
(Table 2): a participant expresses a “strong concern for group wealth” when she favors
total surplus in the group both (i) over equality of earnings in the costless choice DG1,
and (ii) over self-interest in DG2; by contrast, a participant expresses a “strong concern
for equality” when she favors equality of earnings both (i) over total surplus in the
costless choice DG1, and (ii) over self-interest in DG3. The third category is residual.
3.4 Can other-regarding preferences explain the cooperation gap?
The observed cooperation gap between North and South of Italy could stem from differences
in other-regarding preferences. We detect other-regarding preferences by the individual will-
ingness to pay a cost to increase equality or wealth in the group, and measure it through a
set of DGs (see Table 7). The outcome only depends on the dictator; altruists would sacri-
fice to benefit others, but in DGs there is no scope for strategic interactions or conditional
cooperation. The data show that other-regarding preferences cannot explain the cooperation
gap. First, unlike cooperation, other-regarding preferences is not aligned along a North-
South continuum (see Table 7). Second, individual trust does not significantly correlate with
individual levels of other-regarding preferences, and strongly relates with latitude also after
controlling for other-regarding preferences and other individual characteristics (see Model 4
in Table 5). Third, an Oaxaca decomposition shows that the North-South difference in trust
in the TG is not explained by differences in individual other-regarding preferences (Table A-6
in Appendix). The results at the city level also point in the same direction and suggest that
cooperation does not critically depend on other-regarding preferences: for instance, Cuneo
displays the weakest concerns for group wealth and yet is the most cooperative county in our
sample. We thus conclude that the cooperation gap is for the most part driven factors other
than differences in other-regarding preferences across societies.
20 The Oaxaca decomposition (Blinder, 1973; Oaxaca, 1973) is an econometric technique used to decompose a differential
between two groups with respect to a variable of interest: in our case, collaboration and trust in Northern and Southern
Italy. This technique allows to single out what fraction of this differential can be explained by the available control variable,
and what fraction instead remains unexplained.
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4 Long-term persistence
Institutions are fundamental in promoting or discouraging cooperation within a society, and
they could conceivably be responsible for the persistence of a given cooperative behavior
(Zak and Knack, 2001). There are two main mechanisms that could generate such persis-
tence. The first one emphasizes the role of institutions in setting incentives for and payoffs
from cooperation, whereby persistence would arise because of institutional path-dependency;
current institutions are critical in generating cooperation but they generally change rather
slowly over time, hence producing inertia in the observed cooperation levels (Acemoglu and
Robinson, 2012). The second mechanism highlights the impact of institutions in shaping in-
dividual values and social norms, which have the property of surviving beyond the life of the
parent institution, thus sustaining the persistence of a given cooperative behavior (Putnam
et al., 1993; Guiso et al., 2004; Tabellini, 2008; Guiso et al., 2008).
Institutional path-dependency cannot account for our findings: as a result of the experi-
mental methodology, participants across Italy faced no differences across locations in terms
of institutions and of payoffs from cooperation, thus avoiding elements that could potentially
shape behavior such as the degree of corruption, the efficiency of the public administration
or the level of mafia intrusion. The fact that 150 years of common history in terms of for-
mal institutions and language have failed to achieve full convergence in cooperation levels
suggests that the source of persistence is to be sought in values and norms.
Here we focus on the second mechanism and study whether dissimilar pre-unification his-
torical experiences, up to a thousand years ago, could have shaped local values and norms,
which can in turn account for differences in current behavior. There is only so much that we
can test with four cities as to what could have brought about different cooperative disposi-
tions; still, variability within this small set is such as to make it worthwhile to explore its
origins. We consider both political institutions and wars.
Table 8: Historical roots of cooperation
Ragusa Crotone Faenza Cuneo
South ← → North
Quality of political institutions (av-
erage score)
1.86 1.59 2.55 2.43
Number of external violent conflicts 1 5 8 12
Notes: Data refer to years 1000-1860 for institutions and 1000-1849 for conflicts, and
starts in 1175 for Cuneo (foundation year). The quality of institutions reflects the
POLITY IV dataset definition of “constraints to the executive” and ranges from 1
(=unlimited authority) to 7 (=accountable executive, constrained by checks and bal-
ances). External violent conflicts are defined as the sum of offensive warfare, defensive
warfare, and army stationing.
Robert Putnam argued that the free city-state experience in Italy, between 1000 and
1300 A.D., could be the source of the North-South gap in civic norms (Putnam et al., 1993;
Guiso et al., 2004). Other scholars have extended the conjecture to the quality of political
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institutions more generally as the force shaping people’s values and norms (Tabellini, 2010;
Guiso et al., 2008). For this reason, we focus on the institutions protecting the rule of law in
each city between 1000 and 1850. We followed the approach of Tabellini (2008) in codifying
the constraints on the executive power and extended his evidence by six centuries (Table A-7
and A-2 in Appendix).21 The score we obtained in the quality of institutions displays the
same North-South gap as our experimental measures of the ability to cooperate, but does
not significantly differentiate between the two pairs of cities (see, Table 8).
The attempt to explain cooperative dispositions with institutional differences inevitably
begs further questions, as it makes one wonder where do these institutions come from. A
number of theories have taken the matter to a more fundamental level and claimed that
human groups and their institutions are differentially shaped as a result of varying exposure
to violent external conflicts (Tilly, 1992; Bowles, 2009). Gene-culture co-evolutionary models
posit that external conflicts select groups with a higher frequency of cooperators, since groups
so configured have a higher probability of prevailing over an enemy (Bowles, 2009). As a
result, societies with a history of external conflicts would be characterized by a higher level
of in-group cooperation. Pursuing this conjecture, we coded violent external conflicts in each
city since the year 1000 (for further details, see Appendix 3.2). The higher frequency of
conflicts in the North compared to the South matches not only the gap in cooperation levels
in the two broad regions, but also the ranking of cooperation levels that we found in our four
cities (Tables A-8 and A-9). We can thus surmise that conflicts which occurred during the
eight centuries before Unification in 1861 have an impact on the present cooperative norms of
societies. Should this correlation survive a stricter test based on a larger sample of cities, this
evidence would show the genesis of group differences from long-run collective experiences.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
Here we uncover the behavioral foundations of a classic disparity in economic development,
civic norms, and quality of political institutions between the North and the South of Italy.
In a field experiment with a representative sample of the general population, we find that
the ability to cooperate is stronger in the North than in the South. This cooperation gap
emerges even though our methodology silences the impact of legal and economic institutions;
moreover, everyone faces identical payoffs from cooperation, thus these factors cannot be
blamed. Cooperation is independently measured as “trust” and as “contributions to a com-
mon project” and both measures yield the same ranking in the ability to cooperate. The
empirical alignment between trust and contributions level is novel and it also displays the
robustness of the behavioral difference in cooperation between the North and the South of
Italy.
21 For a detailed discussion of the coding procedure, see Appendix 3.1
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The ability to cooperate turned out to be unrelated to individual characteristics, such as
other-regarding or risk preferences: people in the South are no less altruistic or risk tolerant
than people in the North. These results thus suggest that the gap is not due to “moral
flaws”, as famously claimed by Banfield and Fasano (1958). Although in principle other-
regarding and risk preferences could be a determinant of cooperation, in this case study their
empirical impact is dwarfed by other factors. Our interpretation is that the North-South gap
originates in different abilities to cooperate, which represent emergent properties of a society.
Two societies with similar risk preferences and similar fractions of altruists could achieve
different in-group cooperation levels. One possible explanation for the North-South gap is
given by the differences in social norms of conditional cooperation and in the expectations
thereof. Cooperation is unconditional when it is supported by altruists who do not act for a
personal gain; however, it can also emerge in a population of conditional cooperators, who
respond to the expectation – or the realization – that others are cooperative.
This study carries policy implications. If the North-South gap in the ability to cooperate is
rooted in social norms, institutional change alone is unlikely to close the gap. One would first
need to understand the origin of such distinct norms at the local level. Regional disparities in
Italy survived 150 years of common national history, thus displaying long-term persistence,
and several scholars have pointed at heterogeneous experiences in the distant past as the
source of the gap in cooperation levels Putnam et al. (1993); Nunn and Wantchekon (2011);
Guiso et al. (2008). We collected a millennium-long time span dataset, which suggests that
the most plausible conjecture in terms of historical experiences is related to the frequency of
violent conflicts against external enemies Bowles (2009); Tilly (1992). The need to react to
external threats may positively select norms of conditional cooperation in a society, and lay
the bases for a more cooperative future.
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Appendixes
1 Selection of locations and participants
We selected four medium-sized cities in Italy locations to conduct our experiments. Table A-1
summarizes the main characteristics of the four cities and Figure A-1 depicts the laboratory
in the different locations.
Study participants were recruited among the general population of each county. Table
A-2 summarizes the socio-demographic characteristics of the actual sample.
Two professional companies -Metis-Ricerche and Demoskopea- were hired for the recruit-
ment of subjects; we provided them with a script to approach potential participants.1 The
recruiters had no prior knowledge of the purpose or content of the study. We asked them
to recruit people residing in or outside the town where we ran the experiment. In addition
to the aforementioned requirements, special categories of people were ex-ante barred from
participation: employees of the research sector; people who took part in market researches in
the preceding three months prior to the contract; family members of the recruiters; employees
of marketing companies and of the press in general. Moreover, no more than two people per
session should be acquaintances each other.
One company (Metis-Ricerche) recruited subjects for the first five sessions in Faenza. Po-
tential subjects were identified by using telephone book entries and they were approached by
telephone calls. All phases of the recruitment process were carried out from the headquarters
of the company, and, in case of acceptance, the company mailed a confirmation letter to the
participant. Metis-Ricerche decided not to renew the contract for the other locations because
the recruitment procedures turned out to be more costly than expected for them. The other
company (Demoskopea) recruited subjects for two sessions in Faenza and for five sessions in
each of the other cities. Local representatives of Demoskopea carried out the recruitment of
the subjects in each county. Local representatives of Demoskopea carried out the recruitment
of the subjects in each county, by choosing/ randomly extracting names from telephone books
and by using random contacts obtained through personal interactions, as instructed by the
headquarter.
1The script is available upon request to the authors.
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Figure A-1: Mobile laboratory
(a) Crotone (b) Cuneo
(c) Faenza
4
2 Additional statistical analysis
This section presents more statistical analysis and details on the relation between contribu-
tions to the PGG, trust, trustworthiness, other-regardness, risk of nature, and demographic
characteristics of the subject pool.
In Table 3 in the main text, we provide evidence of a positive and significant relation
between individual contributions and trust. As a robustness check, we also run the symmet-
ric linear regression, where the dependent variable is the frequency of trust measured at the
individual level (Table A-3), and the only independent variable in Model 1 is the average
contribution to the public good at the county level. Results indicate that an increase by 1
point (5 percent) in the average contribution to the PGG corresponds to a highly significant
increase of the frequency of trust, by about 6 percentage points. In a second specification
(Table A-3, Model 2), we include additional regressors to control for individual characteris-
tics. Results from Model 2 confirm that the positive and significant relation between trust
and individual contributions to the public good is not driven uniquely by differences in the
individual characteristics of our subjects across counties.
Table A-3: Average individual trust vs. contribution to the PGG at the county level.
Dep.var.: Trust frequency (at the individual level)
Model 1 Model 2
Average Contribution to the
PGG in the county
0.060*** 0.065***
(0.011) (0.015)
Male -0.008
(0.033)
Age 40-59 -0.079
(0.073)
Age 60 and above 0.044
(0.083)
Housewife/Retired -0.110***
(0.026)
Student/Unemployed -0.041
(0.060)
Low understanding -0.034
(0.046)
Missing questionnaire -0.029
(0.108)
N.obs. 242 242
R-squared 0.023 0.047
Notes: OLS regression with standard errors robust for
clustering at the matching-group level (in parentheses).
Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%,
5% and 10% level, respectively.
In Table A-4 we test whether a significant relation emerges between latitude and the
average gains from trust, measured as the average profit obtained by a subject in all periods
when he had the role of truster and decided to trust. Latitude is not significantly correlated
with the gains from trust.
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Table A-4: Average individual gains from trust vs. latitude.
Dep.var.: Average Gains from Trust
Latitude 0.391
(0.260)
N.obs. 176
R-squared 0.007
Notes: OLS regression with stan-
dard errors robust for clustering at the
matching-group level (in parentheses).
Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate sig-
nificance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level,
respectively.
As a further test, we measure the role of individual factors such as the difference in risk
and other-regarding preferences in explaining the differential in collaboration and trust in
the North and South of Italy by means of a (Blinder-) Oaxaca decomposition (Blinder, 1973;
Oaxaca, 1973). The Oaxaca decomposition is an econometric technique used to decompose a
differential between two groups with respect to a variable of interest: in our case, collaboration
and trust in Northern and Southern Italy. This technique allows to single out what fraction of
this differential can be explained by the available control variable, and what fraction instead
remains unexplained. This technique can be implemented only with respect to two groups.
Hence, we can only decompose the North-South differential in cooperation, but not the effect
of latitude across the four cities.
The results of the Oaxaca decomposition for the Public Goods experiment are in Table A-
5 and for the Trust Game experiment are in Table A-6. In the PGG, the estimated difference
in the average contribution between Northern and Southern counties is equal to -1.213 points
(Prediction South - Prediction North), and it is statistically significant at the 5% level (Table
A-5, Model 1). One can see how much of this diff erence can be attributed to differences in
risk preferences. This dimension is coded through two dummy variables (Strongly risk averse
and Risk neutral/Risk loving) and can explain -0.111 point difference in average contribution,
which amounts to only 9%.
Similarly, in the TG, the estimated difference in average trusting behavior is equal to -
0.111 and is statistically significant at the 1% level (A-6, Model 2). For the TG, we have both
individual measures of risk and other-regarding preferences (i.e., the dummies Preference for
Equity and Preference for Efficiency). These two dimensions taken together cannot explain
any of the point difference in average trusting behavior. Indeed, the sign of the coefficients
points in opposite directions (0.002).
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Table A-5: Oaxaca decomposition of North South difference in average contribution to the public good.
Dependent variable: contribution to the PGG
Model 1 Model 2
Prediction South 8.153*** 8.153***
(0.378) (0.358)
Prediction North 9.366*** 9.366***
(0.440) (0.425)
Difference -1.213** -1.213**
(0.580) (0.556)
Strongly risk averse -0.067 -0.076
(0.062) (0.064)
Risk neutral/Risk loving -0.044 -0.059
(0.043) (0.054)
Explained part -0.111 0.024
(0.081) (0.149)
Male -0.011
(0.033)
Low understanding 0.006
(0.043)
Age 40-59 0.058
(0.100)
Age 60 or above 0.002
(0.017)
Housewife/Retired 0.104
(0.094)
Unexplained part -1.102* -1.237**
(0.566) (0.518)
Notes: Regression with standard errors robust for clus-
tering at the session level (in parentheses). Symbols ∗ ∗ ∗,
∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance at the 1%, 5% and 10%
level, respectively.
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Table A-6: Oaxaca decomposition of North South difference in average trusting behavior.
Dependent Variable: contribution to the TG
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Prediction South 0.364*** 0.364*** 0.364***
(0.009) (0.009) (0.013)
Prediction North 0.475*** 0.475*** 0.475***
(0.028) (0.029) (0.033)
Difference -0.111*** -0.111*** -0.111***
(0.029) (0.030) (0.035)
Strongly risk averse 0.007 0.006 0.006
(0.010) (0.009) (0.009)
Risk neutral/Risk loving -0.001 -0.003 -0.001
(0.009) (0.010) (0.010)
Explained part 0.006 0.002 0.003
(0.010) (0.010) (0.015)
Strong concerns for equality -0.001 -0.001
(0.003) (0.003)
Strong concerns for efficiency -0.000 -0.000
(0.002) (0.002)
Male 0.000
(0.004)
Low understanding -0.000
(0.002)
Age 40-59 -0.002
(0.005)
Age 60 or above -0.008
(0.012)
Housewife/Retired 0.009
(0.008)
Unexplained part -0.117*** -0.113*** -0.115***
(0.031) (0.031) (0.036)
Notes: Regression with standard errors robust for clustering at the ses-
sion level (in parentheses). Symbols ∗∗∗, ∗∗, and ∗ indicate significance
at the 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively.
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3 Historical roots of cooperation
A growing number of scholars from different disciplines have interpreted cooperation, and
more generally economic development, as a by-product of distant historical events. In the
following, we link present cooperation levels as measured in our field experiment to data
about the quality of past institutions and the intensity of violent external conflicts in the last
thousand years.
3.1 Institutions and cooperation
Political scientists have pointed out that institutions can shape culture. In particular, the
ongoing presence of well functioning institutions may promoted cultural traits, such as trust
and cooperation, commonly viewed as favorable to economic growth and development. More
specifically, enforcing the rule of law may have prevented abuses against personal freedoms
and property rights, and it might have protected cooperators from the risk of exploitation.
Table A-7 reports data on the level of constraints on the executive authority in our four loca-
tions from the year 1000. Better institutions are more accountable, and they are constrained
by checks and balances that limit the arbitrary use of force and privileges. Republican in-
stitutions – where the rule of law and property rights are respected – are understood to
foster generalized morality and trust. The quality of institutions ranges from 1 (unlimited
authority) to 7 (accountable executive, constrained by checks and balances).2
We extended Tabellini (2010)’s codification back in time, to include years from 1000 to 1580.
For the years before 1580, we considered one century as the reference time span for coding
institutions, as detailed information on shorter time spans were harder to evaluate. We fol-
lowed as close as possible the criteria set in POLITY IV for the variable xconst3 and we also
adapted by Tabellini when coding the quality of institutions from 1580-1860. As data source
we relied on Galasso (1980) as data source. The political entity taken as a reference is not
the city itself, but the State comprising the city.cities4
Table A-7 summarizes the scores from our own research, Tabellini, and POLITY IV, covering
a total of 1012 years. The aggregate score for a city is computed as the average of each score
weighted by its respective time span in years. Table A-7 reports two aggregate scores, one for
the years up to the Italian Unification (1861) and one for the whole period (years 1000-2012).
The data show a gap in the quality of past political institutions between the North and the
South. The city ranking sees Faenza at the top, while Cuneo, Ragusa, and Crotone at the
bottom.
The quality of institutions in the distant past may have had a lower impact on current values
and norms than that of institutions in the recent past. To take this into account, we applied
2Further details about the coding of political institutions and data sources can be found in Tabellini (2010).
3http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm
4An experienced historian, Saverio Amadori, unaware of the goal of the study, was hired to carry out the search and
classification of the quality of institutions. Only edited sources were used.
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a discounting factor to calculate an aggregate score for each city. In particular, we divided
the time span into 25-year intervals, which roughly correspond to a generation. Consider a
discount factor of 0.95 from one generation to the next, and so on; this level of discounting
gives, for instance, a weight of 1 to the quality of institutions in 1999-1975 and a weight of
(0.95)(500/25) = 0.36 to the quality of institutions in years 1499-1475. As a robustness check,
Figure A-2 illustrates the aggregate scores by city for different levels of discounting, ranging
from 1 through 0.7. Panel a of Figure A-2 includes data up to 1849 and Panel b up to 1999.
City ranking is generally robust to different levels of discounting of past events, with the
notable exception of Cuneo that overtakes Faenza for lower discount factors.
Table A-7: Quality of institutions in four Italian cities: Years 1000-2012.
Time span Ragusa Crotone Faenza Cuneo
Source Years (years) Score
Own research XI century 100 2 2 2.5
Own research XII century 100 2.5 2.5 4 3
Own research XIII century 100 3 2 2.5 4
Own research XIV century 100 2 2 3 2
Own research XV century 100 2 1.5 3 3
Own research XVI century 80 2 1 2 2.5
Tabellini 1580-1620 70 1 1 2 2
Tabellini 1680-1720 74 1 1 2 2
Tabellini 1730-1770 50 1 1 2 1
Tabellini 1780-1815 41 1 1 2 1
POLITY IV 1816-1847 32 1 1 1 1
POLITY IV 1848-49 2 1 1 3
POLITY IV 1849-60 11 1 1 1 3
POLITY IV 1861-1900 40 3 3 3 3
POLITY IV 1901-21 21 5 5 5 5
POLITY IV 1922-27 6
POLITY IV 1928-42 15 1 1 1 1
POLITY IV 1943-48 6
POLITY IV 1949-2012 64 7 7 7 7
Weighted averages
Average for years 1000-1860 1.86 1.59 2.55 2.43
Average for years 1000-2012 2.21 1.98 2.80 2.74
Notes: Empty spaces denote either non existence for the city (Cuneo in XI century) or data not available
in the POLITY IV dataset. Cuneo was founded in 1175 and hence the weighted averages comprises a
smaller number of years: 685 for preunification history and 837 for whole period.
3.2 External violent conflicts and cooperation
A growing number of theories have acknowledged the role of violent conflicts in shaping
cooperative attitudes. For instance, Tilly (1992) conjectures that a history of violent conflicts
has a key impact on the internal social and political dynamics of societies. This author studies
the development of the modern national states in Europe between the year 990 and 1992, and
he argues that political rules and apparatuses evolved, together with social and civic norms,
as a by-product of the pursuit of war and military capacity. Bowles and Gintis (2011) posit
that conflicts generate a need for cooperation within the group because the higher the internal
cohesion, the higher the probability of prevailing over the enemy. Winners, in turn, take over
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Figure A-2: Quality of political institutions for different levels of discounting
(a) Years 1000-1849 (b) Years1000-1999
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the power and the resources of the losers, hence granting higher chances of survival to their
offspring, and spreading their culture and institutions. As a result, the emerging society will
be characterized by a higher level of cooperation. Indeed, archaeological and ethnographic
evidence on warfare from Late Pleistocene and early Holocene suggests that selective pressure
of conflicts was strong enough to select and sustain cooperative norms within human societies
(Bowles, 2009). There is also evidence that pro-social behavior within the same generation is
enhanced by exposure to warfare. Cooperation levels in a laboratory experiment were indeed
higher during the 2006 Israeli-Hezbollah war, compared to before or after the war itself
(Gneezy and Fessler, 2012). In another experiment led in Burundi, subjects who reported
to be exposed to violence during the 1993-2003 Hutu-Tutsi war were more likely to behave
altruistically toward their neighbors in an experiment (Voors et al., 2012).
In line with these theories, we conjecture that a higher frequency of past conflicts in a
particular area positively affects present in-group cooperative behavior among the people
who live in that area. Our analysis differs from the existing literature because it focuses on
the link between current levels of cooperation – measured by means of experiments – and
the historical measures of violent external conflicts’ incidence at the local level.
3.3 Coding violent conflicts in Italy
We coded external violent conflicts in the four cities5 over a time span of more than eight
centuries: from 1000 to 1861 (Italian unification).6 This time span is similar to the one
analyzed by Tilly: however, we do not consider the years following the Italian unification,
because from that year on our four cities experienced common history and institutions. We
considered the number of conflicts at the city level. Obtaining a county-level measure of
conflicts was not feasible, since the boundaries of the counties changed repeatedly during
the considered time interval (Table A-10). We examined violent events reported in edited
volumes, and considered as conflicts only events above a given intensity threshold. The
intensity of an event was mainly determined by the war effort exerted by the city and by
the impact of the war on the city. More specifically, the following criteria were taken into
account to evaluate the intensity of each causality: duration of the event; its impact given the
number of soldiers; number of casualties and injuries; severity of the damage to civilian and
military structures inside and outside the city walls; bombing; city looting; devastation of
the countryside in terms of field harvests and livestocks; amount of monetary and territorial
compensations; and speed of the attack. An experienced historian evaluated each event based
on the aforementioned criteria. We considered three types of violent conflicts: defensive
warfare, offensive warfare, army stationing.
5An experienced historian, Saverio Amadori, unaware of the goal of the study, was hired to carry out the search and
classification of conflicts. Only edited sources were used.
6Faenza, Crotone, and Ragusa were founded before 1000. Cuneo instead was founded 1175 and hence previous conflicts
were not coded for this city.
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Defensive warfare is a violent conflict sustained by the city (and thus promoted by the
enemy) such as a siege, an invasion of the countryside, or occupation of buildings or forti-
fications in the territory under the political rule of the city. Such an event is classified as
defensive warfare when there is city looting, or in presence of casualties or injuries. In alter-
native, an event is classified as defensive warfare when two or more of the following elements
are simultaneously present: (a) destruction of the territories surrounding the city or station-
ing of armies; (b) damage to civilian and military facilities; (c) bombing; and (d) surprise
attack (without a prior declaration of war). This category can include conflicts sustained by
the political entity in which the city is located (e.g., the Kingdom of Naples for Crotone), but
only if the conflict somehow involved the city itself. It also includes warfare episodes fought
by opposing factions inside the city itself, but only when there is an intervention by sup-
porting external military forces coming from other cities. On the other hand, our definition
of violent conflicts excludes purely internal disputes which involve different factions of the
same city, conspiracies, hostages handovers, coups d’e´tat and internal changes in the control
of political power, or disputes that were resolved simply by means of monetary payments.
We also exclude the transit of armies if the army abstains from damages, even in exchange
for monetary or territorial compensations.
Offensive warfare is a violent conflict with causalities and injuries promoted by the city,
such as the siege of another city, the invasion of the countryside, occupation of buildings
or fortifications in the territory of other entities. Such an event is classified as offensive
warfare where there are (a) casualties or injuries among the city population excluding the
soldiers of fortune and, in addition, there is either an (b) army stationing, or (c) bombing.
Financial and logistic support to warfare fought by mercenaries and soldiers of fortune can
be part of the offensive warfare. Dispatch of troops by the city’s political power, even when
is alliance with other cities or states, is also considered conflict. We exclude conflicts that
only entail taking hostages among the enemies, and also conflicts promoted by the political
entity in which the city is located, if the city itself is neither the decision-making seat nor has
the logistic management of the conflict, and if the conflict does not include military service
for its own citizens. We also exclude disputes resolved simply by monetary transactions or
territorial compensations, and those that involved only army stationing.
Army stationing is the presence of others’ armies in the area under the political rule of
the city, even in the absence of an attack. The criteria for identification of an event as a
conflict comes from the combination of three elements: (a) the size of the foreign army; (b)
the length of the stationing; (c) and the explicit will to damage the territory. We exclude
the simple transit of an army. If the transit includes raids, then it is classified as defensive
warfare.
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3.3.1 Ranking cities by level of violent conflicts
Based on the coding described above, we built several measures of conflict intensity (Tables
A-8 and A-9). The first measure is the raw sum of all conflicts classified as defensive or of-
fensive warfare, and army stationing. This measure of conflict intensity displays a latitudinal
ordering; Cuneo is the city with the highest conflict intensity, followed by Faenza, Crotone,
and Ragusa. It is worth noticing that Cuneo has 12 times as many conflicts as Ragusa,
and more than twice as Crotone. The difference is even more striking if we consider that
observations for Cuneo are available starting only from 1175. The ranking does not change
when we consider the average number of conflicts per generation – conventionally taken as
covering 25 years – which is equal to the total number of conflicts divided by the number of
generations for which data are available.
Conflicts are not evenly distributed over time in the four cities and it is possible that
more recent conflicts might have had a higher impact on present social norms and behavior,
if compared to conflicts in the distant past. We weight conflict intensity according to an
exponential function, using a discount factor of 0.98 for each generation of 25 years. This
gives weight 1 to events in years 1850-1875, weight 0.98 to years 1825-1845, weight 0.96
to 1800-1824, and so on. An event in years 1000-1024 has half the weight of an event at
the time of the Italian unification (0.50). Also this measure of conflict intensity exhibits a
latitudinal ordering. On the other hand, if we adopt a lower discount factor (0.95), Faenza and
Crotone become really close, and Crotone is slightly ahead (Table A-8). When we consider
only defensive warfares and discard events of offensive warfare and army stationing, conflict
intensity is still ordered according to latitude (Table A-9).
Table A-8: All violent conflicts in four Italian cities: Years 1000-1849.
Ragusa Crotone Faenza Cuneo
Sum of all conflicts 1 5 8 12
Average number of conflicts
per generation
0.03 0.15 0.23 0.44
Discounted sum of conflicts
(0.98 factor)
0.67 3.98 5.27 8.99
Discounted sum of conflicts
(0.95 factor)
0.36 2.86 2.83 5.91
Notes: The table includes offensive warfare, defensive warfare, and army stationing as
defined in the text. Average computed for years 1000-1849 for Ragusa, Crotone, Faenza and
for years 1175-1849 for Cuneo. When considering 25 years the span of one generation, we
have 28 generations for Cuneo, and 35 for the three other cities.
Our study provides unique evidence that experimental measures of cooperation correlate
with the frequency of conflicts that has characterized the history of the four cities involved
in our study. This result is in line with the hypothesis that ancestral experiences of conflict
permanently shape a society’s norm of cooperation.
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Table A-9: Defensive warfares in four Italian cities: Years 1000-1849.
Ragusa Crotone Faenza Cuneo
Sum of defensive conflicts 1 3 5 11
Average number of conflicts
per generation
0.03 0.09 0.15 0.41
Discounted sum of conflicts
(0.98 factor)
0.67 2.45 3.27 8.25
Discounted sum of conflicts
(0.95 factor)
0.36 1.86 1.74 5.45
Notes: Average computed for years 1000-1849 for Ragusa, Crotone, Faenza
and for years 1175-1849 for Cuneo. When considering 25 years the span of one
generation, we have 28 generations for Cuneo, and 35 for the three other cities.
Table A-10: Count of external violent conflicts.
time interval Ragusa Crotone Faenza Cuneo
1000-1024
1025-1049
1050-1074
1075-1099
1100-1124 1d
1125-1149
1150-1174
1175-1199
1200-1224 1
1225-1249
1250-1274 1d
1275-1299 1d
1300-1324
1325-1349
1350-1374 1d 1d + 1 1d
1375-1399 2d
1400-1424 1d 1d
1425-1449 1d
1450-1474
1475-1499 1d + 1 1
1500-1524 1 1d
1525-1549 1 1d
1550-1574 1d 1d
1575-1599
1600-1624
1625-1649 1d
1650-1674
1675-1699 1d
1700-1724
1725-1749 1d
1750-1774
1775-1799
1800-1824 1d
1824-1849
1850-1861
Notes: We denote with “d” the defensive warfare; other conflicts are either offensive
warfare or army stationing.
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